Key nuance: Australia's exposure is INDIRECT. It imports refined products from Asian refineries (Singapore, South Korea, China) which themselves source Hormuz crude. A Hormuz closure doesn't zero Australia's imports — it tightens the global market, and Australia competes for remaining supply at higher prices. The "alternative sourcing" slider captures how much of the shortfall these refineries can backfill from non-Hormuz crude.

Australia's Supply Chain

Daily Consumption 1.10 mb/d
DCCEEW: ~1.1 mb/d total petroleum.
0.90 1.30
Import Dependency 90%
Only 2 domestic refineries remain. ~17% from domestic refining, ~5.6% domestic crude.
80% 95%
Hormuz Exposure (indirect) 50%
ASPI/CrudeOilPeak: ~50% of imports trace to Hormuz crude via Asian refineries.
35% 65%
Alternative Sourcing Ability 20%
Can Asian refineries substitute non-Hormuz crude? Partial — competition from all buyers.
5% 50%

Results

Global supply reduction
Australia total imports
Imports linked to Hormuz
Supply at risk (before alternatives)
Offset by alternative sourcing
Net supply reduction
As % of consumption

Sources (see /research/australia_exposure.md)